What Is Commercial Speech - The Issue Not Decided in \u3ci\u3eNike v. Kasky\u3c/i\u3e by Chemerinsky, Erwin & Fisk, Catherine
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4
2004
What Is Commercial Speech - The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky
Erwin Chemerinsky
Catherine Fisk
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech - The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1143 (2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol54/iss4/6
WHAT IS COMMERCIAL SPEECH?
THE ISSUE NOT DECIDED IN
NIKE V. KASKY
Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fiskt
May a company selling tuna fish tell consumers-in adver-
tisements, letters to environmental groups, and elsewhere-that its
tuna is caught in a dolphin-safe manner, when company officials
know that the company's nets regularly capture and kill dolphins?
May a cosmetics company tell consumers-through advertise-
ments, letters to department stores, and otherwise-that it does not
test its products on animals, even though it knows that it regularly
uses animal testing in a way that many of its customers would find
repugnant? May an agricultural company tell consumers that its
products are organic when it knows that it uses pesticides and her-
bicides that would not fit anyone's definition of organic? May a
manufacturer represent that its products were "made in the United
States" or produced with union labor, when it knows those state-
ments are untrue?
The issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky' was whether the First
Amendment protects a company's making false factual statements
about its products, likely to matter greatly to some consumers in
their purchasing decisions, in an effort to increase sales. An indi-
vidual sued Nike, alleging that Nike made false and misleading
statements regarding its labor practices in press releases, letters to
newspapers, and letters to university presidents and athletic direc-
tors. The statements were made in response to a series of broad-
' Erwin Chemerinsky is the Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal
Ethics, and Political Science, University of Southern California. Catherine Fisk is a Professor of
Law at the University of Southern California. This Article is adapted from an amicus curiae we
submitted in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of members of the United States Con-
gress in Nike v. Kasky.
l 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (dismissing the case as certiorari having been improvidently
granted).
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cast and print media reports alleging that, in factories in China,
Vietnam, and Indonesia where Nike products are made, workers
are paid less and required to work longer hours than permitted un-
der applicable law and were subjected to verbal and physical abuse
and unsafe working conditions. The complaint alleged, in part,
that Nike's statements regarding its labor practices were know-
ingly false. The trial court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding
that the First Amendment protected Nike's speech even if it was
false and misleading. The California Supreme Court reversed.2
The California Supreme Court held that Nike's speech was
commercial speech that could be punished under state false adver-
tising and unfair competition laws. It reasoned that Nike's speech
was commercial speech rather than constitutionally protected po-
litical speech because three factors were met. First, the speaker,
Nike and its officers, engaged in commerce. Nike is a commercial
speaker communicating a commercial message.3 Specifically, it
"manufacture[s], import[s], distribute[s], and sell[s] consumer
goods in the form of athletic shoes and apparel."4 Second, the in-
tended audience was composed largely of actual and potential pur-
chasers of Nike products. The letters that Nike sent to the colleges
were "addressed directly to actual and potential purchasers of
Nike's products"5 and the letters to newspaper editors were state-
ments to "maintain and/or increase its sales and profits."6 And,
third, the content of the speech consisted of representations of fact
of a commercial nature that were intended to maintain and increase
sales of Nike products.7 The court noted that by "describing its
own labor policies, and the practices and working conditions in
factories where its products are made, Nike was making factual
representations about its own business operations" with the aim of
increasing its sales.
8
When the United States Supreme Court granted Nike's peti-
tion for certiorari, Nike argued that its speech, even if false, was
absolutely protected by the First Amendment because it was politi-
cal (since it concerned sweatshops) rather than commercial speech
(such as statements about price or ingredients). The position taken
by Nike and its amici in the United States Supreme Court failed to
recognize that consumers may care more about the conditions un-
2 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
' Id. at 258.
4 id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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der which goods are produced-whether the tuna is caught in a
dolphin-safe manner, whether cosmetics are tested in a "cruelty-
free" way, whether the produce is organic, whether the shoe com-
pany produces its products in "sweatshops" with inadequate wages
and working conditions-than the price, ingredients, or caloric
content.
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted. The Court was correct to dismiss Nike v. Kasky without
reaching this issue. In fact, in our amicus brief to the Supreme
Court, we urged that the case be dismissed for exactly the reasons
given by Justice Stevens: Kasky did not have an injury sufficient
to satisfy Article III's standing requirement and there was no final
judgment by the California courts.9 But the result of the dismissal
was that the important underlying issue in the case was unresolved.
The settlement of the case means that some other litigation will
need to be the occasion for addressing and resolving the constitu-
tional questions presented by Nike v. Kasky.
In this Article, we make two major points. First, we describe
and defend the line between commercial and noncommercial
speech and show that Nike's speech was safely on the commercial
side of the line. Factual statements by a manufacturer to consum-
ers about its products with the objective of increasing sales are and
should be considered commercial speech. Second, we argue that
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
should be maintained and that the Court should not impose the
heightened scienter requirement that Nike advocated. Our focus in
this Article, and this Symposium, is Nike v. Kasky. But the case is
a vehicle for examining difficult, unresolved, and important issues
of First Amendment law.
I. FACTUAL STATEMENTS BY A MANUFACTURER TO
CONSUMERS ABOUT ITS PRODUCTS WITH THE OBJECTIVE
OF INCREASING SALES ARE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. The Reasons for According Commercial Speech Reduced
First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has consistently held that commercial
speech is a distinct category of expression that is not afforded the
same First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,10 the Court "recognized 'the "commonsense" distinction be-
9 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2557 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring).
'0 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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tween speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in
an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech."'' 1' The Court expressly declared that "[tihe
Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression."'
' 2
Commercial speech should be regarded as a distinct category
of expression for three reasons. First, "[tihe truth of commercial
speech ... may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator" be-
cause the speaker provides "information about a specific product
or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else."'13 Second, commercial speech is less eas-
ily chilled because commercial speakers have an economic incen-
tive to speak which counteracts any chilling effect that might occur
from regulation. 4 Third, "[t]he interest in preventing commercial
harms justifies more intensive regulation of commercial speech
than noncommercial speech."' 15 False commercial speech causes
economic harms to consumers who are deceived into buying prod-
ucts and services that do not meet their needs or expectations. As
Justice Stevens observed: "The evils of false commercial speech,
which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial
transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial
speech to control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more gov-
ernmental regulation of this speech than of most other speech."'
' 6
All of these concerns were implicated in Nike v. Kasky. First,
Nike was in the best position to know about the conditions under
which its products were manufactured. Nike made much in its
brief of the difficulty of overseeing its far-flung network of con-
tractors around the globe.' 7 But as compared to consumers, it still
has far better access to the evidence concerning the working condi-
tions in places where its products are made. Moreover, surely the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech cannot
rest on the size or the subcontracting practices of a seller of prod-
ucts. If Nike were to lie to its customers about the quality of its
shoes or the materials from which they are made, it should enjoy
no greater constitutional protection from a false advertising suit
than a small company. Because California's Unfair Competition
" Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
12 Id. at 562-63.
13 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976).
14 id.
15 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,426 n.21 (1993).
16 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17 See Brief for the Petitioners at 40, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-
575).
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Law 8 and False Advertising Law' 9 do not impose strict liability,
the appropriate way to deal with the truth of Nike's assertions is in
a defense, not by granting it blanket constitutional protection.
Second, Nike's strong economic incentive to maintain and ex-
pand sales of its products, even in the face of anti-sweatshop criti-
cism, will ensure that it will continue speaking out about its labor
practices. Nike argued in its brief that the prospect of liability
might or did chill the company's speech and that it had refrained
from some speech.20 But nothing in the record of the case sup-
ported that factual assertion and no court made findings about it.
Moreover, the question of whether a particular regulation is likely
to chill protected speech needs to be made on more than an ad hoc
basis. Examination of the spectrum of cases involving allegedly
false advertising shows that there is no reason to believe that com-
panies will be chilled in speaking out on general issues for fear of
false advertising suits when they make false statements about their
products or processes. The Supreme Court long has noted that
commercial speech is unlikely to be chilled. In fact, the Court has
nearly directly refuted Nike's contention when it observed:
"Commercial speech, because of its importance to business profits,
and because it is carefully calculated, is also less likely than other
forms of speech to be inhibited by proper regulation.'
The third rationale for less regulation of commercial speech-
the government's interest in preventing commercial harms-was
also implicated in Nike. California's law exists to protect consum-
ers from exactly the harms alleged in Kasky's complaint: a com-
pany intentionally and recklessly making false statements out of a
desire to increase its sales among consumers who care about the
conditions under which the goods are produced.
B. The Line Between Commercial and Noncommercial Speech
Not only were the policies underlying the commercial speech
doctrine implicated by Nike's statements, its statements to con-
sumers about its products were commercial speech under the gov-
erning Bolger test. The Supreme Court, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.,22 identified three characteristics that distinguish
commercial from noncommercial speech: (1) whether the commu-
nication is an advertisement; (2) whether it concerns a product;
IS CAL. Bus. & PROF CODE §§ 17200-209 (West 2000).
'I ld. at §§ 17500-509 (West 2000).
20 Brief for the Petitioners at 38-39, Nike (No. 02-575).
21 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
22 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation.2 3 in ad-
dition, the Court has explicitly held that the fact that the speech
concerns public issues is not sufficient to take it out of the realm of
commercial speech, for to do so would enable a company "to im-
munize false or misleading product information from government
regulation simply by including references to public issues. 2 4
All three elements of the Bolger test are met by Nike's
speech. First, many of Nike's statements that formed the basis for
Kasky's complaint were in the form of paid advertisements. Nike
"took out full-page advertisements in major U.S. newspapers (New
York Times, Washington Post, U.S.A. Today, San Francisco
Chronicle, etc.)."'25 The rest of Nike's statements, although not in
the form of paid advertisements, were part of a public relations
campaign designed to sell products. As discussed below, the form
of the communication should not be determinative of whether it is
commercial speech. If Nike sent letters to university presidents
and athletic directors inaccurately describing the price of its prod-
ucts or falsely describing their quality, there would be no dispute
as to whether those letters constituted commercial speech even
though not in the traditional form of a paid advertisement. These
were not statements by Nike officials as part of a debate on a col-
lege campus or on a TV news show or in an interview with a print
or broadcast journalist; these statements were part of Nike's public
relations campaign. In an era when corporations increasingly see
news coverage as a form of PR, and news shows as crucial forum
in their advertising and public relations campaigns, the line be-
tween news and advertising is blurred. But that does not mean that
the line should not or does not exist. Nike's statements were on
the PR side of that line.
The second element of the Bolger test was thus likewise met:
The statements were about Nike's products and how they were
produced. Nike's statements were not about general working con-
ditions in the apparel industry; the statements were specifically
about the conditions under which Nike products are made. Nike
was not opining on the desirability of sweatshops as a form of
economic development in Southeast Asia, or even generally on
whether its practices were good or bad for its workers or the coun-
tries in which they live. Rather, it made factual statements about
2 Id. at 66-67.
24 Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
25 First Amended Complaint at 1 56, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No.
994446).
JVol. 54:4
WHAT IS COMMERCIAL SPEECH?
its practices to actual and prospective consumers for the purpose of
selling its products.
Third, Nike indisputably had an economic motivation. Nike
made the factual statements about its labor practices with the ob-
jective of persuading consumers to buy its products. College
presidents and athletic directors are an important part of Nike's
business. Letters to them, and paid advertisements in newspapers,
stating that the products were produced under safe and lawful con-
ditions, were not about debating globalization; they plainly were
aimed to ensure continued sales.
Perhaps because of the weakness of its arguments that its
speech was noncommercial under established law, Nike advocated
a new and much narrower test for commercial speech than the
Court articulated in Bolger. Nike contended that commercial
speech is speech that does "'no more than propose a commercial
transaction"' and that is "'related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience."'' 26 The approach that Nike pro-
posed before the Supreme Court would substantially narrow the
current definition of commercial speech. It would jeopardize fed-
eral and state deceptive practices and false advertising laws by al-
lowing companies to make intentionally false factual statements
about their products with the goal of increasing sales.
Part of Nike's argument was to argue for a narrower test for
commercial speech, and part of its argument strategy was to chal-
lenge the way its speech was characterized both in Kasky's com-
plaint (which was taken as true since the case was dismissed on the
pleadings) and in the lower court. As Nike characterized the facts,
its statements were mere expressions of opinion on matters of pub-
lic concern. The problem with this strategy was that it was con-
trary to the facts. Nike's statements were not expressions of opin-
ion about the desirability of using sweatshops or of globalization.
It was not political speech intended to influence public policy. It
was not speaking generally about labor practices in Southeast
Asia, or about the effect of globalization on Third World economic
development. Rather, the entire focus of Kasky's complaint was
on the false factual statements made by Nike in an effort to in-
crease sales of its products. As the Supreme Court powerfully ob-
served: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value
26 Brief for the Petitioners at 22, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575) (citations omitted).
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in false statements of fact.",27  As the California Supreme Court
recognized, if Nike's ads and letters defended globalization gener-
ally, or argued that its practices were beneficial to the workers in
Asia, its speech would be protected. Thus, Nike is wrong to state
that California law prohibits it from speaking out "on nearly every
public issue-from a company's diversity policy to its community
relations efforts to its political activities. ' 8 It can offer its posi-
tions on public issues freely. But Nike's speech was not a general
opinion about an issue of public interest; it was speaking about the
specific practices under which its own products are made.
C. False Speech About a Product's "Moral" Qualities
Is Nevertheless Commercial Speech
All agree that when it comes to commercial speech "it is the
interest of the listener that is paramount, rather than that of the
speaker.,29 Consumers have a variety of concerns when they buy
products, and concerns about the conditions under which products
are made are entitled to no less protection than concerns about
price. Nike, in its brief to the Supreme Court, attempted to dismiss
these consumer concerns as mere "moral judgments that only indi-
rectly affect consumer behavior 30 or that "affect[] purchasing
choices only secondarily, if at all.' It asserted that those con-
cerns bear "only a tangential relation to commercial transac-
tions. 32 The ACLU, in its amicus brief, labeled the concerns as
merely "political," though it conceded that such concerns may in-
deed affect consumer behavior,33 and would limit false advertising
laws to statements about price, safety, quality, or the "essential
purpose or function" of a product. 34 Nike and the ACLU were
wrong as a matter of fact and as a matter of First Amendment law.
As the Solicitor General noted in its amicus brief to the Su-
preme Court, the concerns of consumers cannot be so easily dis-
missed. 35 For instance, Jewish consumers who observe kosher die-
tary laws may care more about the conditions under which food
27 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (emphasis added).
28 Brief for the Petitioners at 27, Nike (No. 02-575).
29 Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern
California in Support of Petitioner at 7, Nike (No. 02-575).
30 Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Nike (No. 02-575).
31 Id. at 36.
32 Id.
33 See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of North-
ern California in Support of Petitioner at 4, Nike (No. 02-575).
34 Id. at 13; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 35, Nike (No. 02-575).
35 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27-28, Nike (No.
02-575).
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products are made (i.e., under rabbinic supervision, or not involv-
ing work on Saturdays) than about price. Their "moral" concerns
about products likely have a greater and more direct impact on
their buying than so-called "economic" concerns. Yet, false asser-
tions about whether a product is kosher-whether on the product
label, in paid advertising, in letters to consumers, or even in news-
papers-would, under Nike's test, be beyond the reach of state
false advertising laws. Similarly, false assertions by a company
about whether its products are produced without pesticides or in
other environmentally sustainable methods would be beyond regu-
lation, even though many consumers prioritize whether a product
is organic over its price. Many consumers would pay more for
tuna caught in a dolphin-safe manner, or for cosmetics produced
without animal testing, or for goods made in the United States, or
for sneakers made in humane working conditions. Nike and its
amici were wrong in assuming that these concerns are less impor-
tant to consumers than other aspects of a product and its price.
The efforts of Nike and its amicus, the ACLU, to distinguish
statements about price, safety, or "the essential functions" of a
product are entirely subjective. Who is to say who decides what
are the "essential" aspects of a product? For some, dolphin-safe
tuna may be more important than whether tuna is packed in water
or oil. There is no principled reason to accord different constitu-
tional protection to an auto manufacturer's false statements about
the injuries suffered by passengers in its cars, as opposed to state-
ments about the injuries suffered by passengers in other cars in-
volved in the crash or injuries suffered by workers who manufac-
ture them. Consumer concerns about the safety of products should
not receive less constitutional solicitude than consumer concerns
about the safety of products to others, to the environment, or to
workers.
Nor can this distinction be justified by saying that harms to
consumers concerned about anything other than price, quality, or
safety are non-"commercial" and thus not within the legitimate
scope of government regulation of commerce.36 Consumers who
are misled about which companies to patronize suffer a commer-
cial harm within the meaning of the Supreme Court's precedents.37
Consumers who are misled in purchasing products based on false
statements about whether they contain pork suffer financial loss
3 Nike made this argument in its brief to the Supreme Court. Brief for the Petitioners at
35, Nike (No. 02-575).
37 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opin-
ion) (discussing the government's interest in protecting consumers in their spending decisions).
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whether they avoid pork for reasons of allergy, religious belief, or
scruples about the slaughtering of hogs. The First Amendment
should grant no less protection to consumers who avoid beef pro-
duced under certain conditions for fear of "mad cow" disease than
those who avoid beef out of concerns for the welfare of cows or of
those who raise and slaughter them. Consumers who avoid prod-
ucts produced without rabbinic supervision need to make informed
purchasing decisions just as do consumers who avoid products
produced in sweatshops. Their motives for buying or eschewing
products are irrelevant; false factual statements that might influ-
ence their buying are commercial harms and they are well within
the power of states to regulate.
Nothing but Nike's or the ACLU's own political preferences
justifies treating consumers with humanitarian or environmental
concerns with less solicitude and respect than consumers who
count calories or pennies. As the Solicitor General argued in its
brief to the Supreme Court, sellers should not be able fraudulently
to command the premium prices that consumers will pay for envi-
ronmentally friendly products any more than sellers can command
premium prices for false statements about quantity or quality.38
The range of legitimate consumer concerns that may motivate
buying is vast. Consumers who are concerned about the testing of
products on animals, or about whether a product is organic, or
about whether tuna is caught using dolphin-safe nets, or whether
goods are made by union labor, would, under Nike's test, be un-
protected. Some consumers may choose one brand of lemonade or
pasta sauce over another based on the manufacturer's claim that it
donates some percentage of the profits from the sale of its foods to
charity. Others may care about the fuel efficiency of automobiles
because of the expense, while some care because of their concerns
about the environment or excessive dependence on foreign oil.
The heart of the distinction that Nike sought to draw between
"moral" or "political" concerns about products and "economic"
ones is that all noneconomic concerns about products will be pro-
tected by the marketplace of ideas. 39 That is simply not true. The
commercial speech doctrine is premised on the Court's longstand-
ing belief that the truth about a company's products and facilities
will not emerge if the seller can lie about it. Consumers do not
have access to the seller's facility and do not have the time to in-
vestigate the truth of the dozens or hundreds of claims they read or
38 Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28, Nike (No.
02-575).
39 Brief for the Petitioners at 34, Nike (No. 02-575).
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hear about products every day. While it is true that when the char-
acteristics of some products become controversial-whether ciga-
rettes cause cancer, or SUVs pollute more than autos, or ground
beef was produced in a way that increases the chance it will con-
tain nerve tissue-it is more likely that the truth of some sellers'
claims may be tested. But, according to Nike's own admission, its
products are made in 900 factories in 51 countries, making it im-
possible for consumers of Nike products to know what goes on
there. Moreover, there are dozens of companies that manufacture
and sell athletic products and thousands that make and sell cloth-
ing generally. The fact that Nike's practices have received public
attention should not allow it and all other clothing manufacturers
blanket immunity from false advertising liability. The line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech cannot be based on
a subjective, ad hoc, and changing assessment of which issues
have sufficient political salience as to make consumer protection
laws unnecessary.
Not only was Nike's effort to distinguish between commercial
and political speech about products based on the preferences of
consumers without support in law or logic, it would also be impos-
sible to administer. If an auto manufacturer were to make false
assertions in newspapers about the mileage of its SUVs, its speech
would be commercial speech as regards consumers concerned only
about fuel efficiency for cost reasons, but not as regards consumers
concerned about fuel efficiency because of the effect on the envi-
ronment or on American dependence on foreign oil. Statements to
consumers who are allergic to pesticides could be regulated, but
the same statement to those who avoid them because of the effect
of pesticide spraying on agricultural workers could not. A false
statement about whether there was meat within a product would be
commercial speech if directed to consumers who avoid eating meat
for health reasons, but not if it was directed to those who do so out
of concern for the welfare of animals.
D. References to Specific Products and Format of Speech
Are Not Determinative
Nike argued further to the Supreme Court that false state-
ments of fact about its factory conditions are constitutionally pro-
tected so long as they contain no reference to its specific prod-
ucts. 4° This argument is mistaken because Nike's statements obvi-
ously concerned its products, even though they did not single out
4o Brief for the Petitioners at 24, Nike (No. 02-575).
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any particular one. A cosmetics company that runs a series of ad-
vertisements claiming that all of its products are manufactured
without animal testing surely is engaging in commercial speech
even if it does not mention specific lipsticks or eye makeup that it
sells.
Under the California Supreme Court's rule, companies remain
free to speak out about the benefits of animal testing, the desirabil-
ity of using pesticides, or any other issue. They simply cannot
make false factual statements about their own practices. Under
Nike's approach, Congress and the states would be powerless to
prohibit intentionally false advertisements by a company about
whether its products are made without use of testing on animals or
without use of any pesticides. A restaurant could lie about
whether its kitchen is kosher, so long as it did not mention any par-
ticular product.
Whether speech is commercial speech is not determined by
the format. Statements about a product by a manufacturer to pro-
spective consumers are commercial speech even if they are not
paid advertisements or on the product label, and even if they do
not concern the price, quantity, or quality of the product. If Nike
put leaflets under the doors in college students' dorms concerning
the price and characteristics of its sneakers, no one would deny
that this was commercial speech even though it was not a paid ad-
vertisement. If Nike had written to college athletic directors and
made false assertions that the stitching on its shoes was strong, its
statements would indisputably be deemed commercial speech. If it
sent letters to assure prospective consumers that its working condi-
tions ensured high quality products, its statements would be re-
garded as commercial. The reason is that the statements were to
induce customers to buy its products. Nike's statements that gave
rise to the Kasky litigation were no different.
Nike argued that the California Supreme Court's test for
commercial speech was wrong because it failed to distinguish be-
tween speech made in an obviously commercial format-like a
paid advertisement-and speech made in a less obviously com-
mercial format-like letters to consumers or letters to newspapers.
The distinction Nike seeks to draw, however, would protect both
too much and too little speech, and the test for commercial speech
used by the California Supreme Court is completely consistent
with the Supreme Court's decisions as well as with the underlying
reasons why commercial speech is treated as a distinct category of
expression under the First Amendment.
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First, regardless of format, an important distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech is whether the speaker is a
person or entity "engaged in commerce., 41 It is highly relevant,
although not determinative, that the speech was by an entity en-
gaged in commerce, rather than by someone running for office,
attacking or defending legislation, or implementing a law or pol-
icy.
Second, the California Supreme Court correctly emphasized
that the "intended audience [of commercial speech] is likely to be
actual or potential buyers or customers of the speaker's goods or
services, or persons acting for actual or potential buyers or cus-
tomers. 42 Nike's speech was directed at buyers of its products,
including universities and individual consumers.
Third, "the factual content of the message should be commer-
cial in character ' 43 in that "it is likely to influence consumers in
their commercial decisions." 44  Kasky's complaint is concerned
with the false factual statements made by Nike; not its expression
of political opinions. Nike's statements were commercial in that
their sole purpose was to increase sales of its products.
The core of Nike's criticism of the California Supreme
Court's test for commercial speech was that it would give busi-
nesses less protection under the First Amendment than the speech
of the businesses' critics. In particular, Nike and its amici argued
to the Supreme Court that Nike's statements must be treated as
noncommercial speech lest Nike critics receive greater First
Amendment protection for their criticism of the company's prod-
ucts than the company receives for its defense of its products. In
fact, however, the opposite is true. To accept Nike's position
would give it greater protection than those criticizing its practices.
If Nike's critics make false statements about it and its prod-
ucts, then Nike can bring a suit for defamation and product defa-
mation. The Supreme Court has allowed corporations to sue for
45defamation to protect their business reputation. Tort law in every
state permits corporations to bring actions for defamation and for
product disparagement. 46 Whether Nike would need to prove ac-
41 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002).
42 Id. at 256.
43 id.
44 Id. at 261.
45 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (al-
lowing a business to sue a credit reporting agency for defamation where the agency mistakenly
reported that the business had filed for bankruptcy).
46 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 (1965) (addressing defamation of
corporations); El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975) (dismissing an
action for libel where a New Jersey business sued a magazine for listing a street outside the
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tual malice or only negligence will depend on whether corpora-
tions are characterized as public or private figures, and whether its
statements are of public concern.4 7 But Nike undoubtedly may sue
its critics who make false statements about Nike and its products.
By contending that its expression is political speech protected
by the First Amendment, Nike implicitly asserted that it cannot be
held liable under the First Amendment even if its statements were
intentional falsehoods. In the political arena, false speech is gen-
erally protected so long as it does not constitute a tort such as
defamation or false light.48 If Nike's speech is regarded as politi-
cal expression and as such is protected by the First Amendment
despite its falsity, then Nike would have greater protection than its
critics. Further, although Nike argued that the truth about its
products will emerge in the marketplace of ideas, Nike's critics are
quite likely to be chilled by the threat of product defamation suits.
Indeed, anti-sweatshops activists have been the subject of defama-
tion suits in California.49
II. FALSE COMMERCIAL SPEECH SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Nike litigation not only raised the question of the proper
definition of commercial speech; Nike also sought to address
whether actual malice, negligence, or strict liability is the appro-
priate standard for liability for false advertising. As we explain
below, Nike v. Kasky was a poor vehicle for deciding this question.
The scienter issue was not presented by the pleadings or ruled on
by the lower courts. More broadly, however, we argue that false
commercial speech, which has long been subject to state and fed-
eral regulation, should remain so.
owner's restaurant as a prevalent area for narcotics trafficking); Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co.
v. Local Union No. 2928, 152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1945) (discussing an Illinois corporation's suit
for libel against a union for disparaging remarks made in a union publication).
41 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (describing standards of
proof in defamation cases).
48 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (holding that in order to recover
for false light invasion of privacy, plaintiff needed to prove that the defendant published its
reports with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth).
49 See, e.g., Fashion 21, Inc. v. Garment Workers Ctr., No. BC269427 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super., filed March 6, 2002), appeal and petition for writ of mandate pending (Cal. Ct. App.
Nos. B 163114, B 159788) (complaint for libel and unfair competition alleging anti-sweatshop
activists defamed the company by protesting wage and hour law violations in flyers and at ral-
lies and other organized protest activities).
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A. The Scienter Requirement
Nike argued in its brief that the California law imposes strict
liability for false advertising and that instead "actual malice" is the
appropriate standard for liability. 50 The issue of scienter, however,
was not ruled on by the California Supreme Court. The California
Supreme Court did not hold, as Nike implied, that there is strict
liability for false advertising under the California unfair competi-
tion law.5' Quite the contrary, the California Supreme Court did
not discuss the issue of scienter at all because its decision focused
entirely on whether Nike's expression was commercial speech un-
der the United States and California Constitutions.
Moreover, Kasky's complaint expressly alleged intentional
and knowing false statements by Nike. Paragraph 30 of the First
Amended Complaint stated: "Nike has represented that its products
are manufactured in compliance with applicable laws and regula-
tions requiring wages and overtime. The representations are inten-
tionally and/or recklessly misleading and deceptive and/or were
negligently made., 52 Indeed, the complaint alleged throughout that
Nike intentionally and knowingly made false statements concern-
ing the production of its products. For example, Paragraph 80 of
the First Amended Complaint stated that "Nike's misrepresenta-
tions were made with knowledge or with reckless disregard of the
laws of California prohibiting false and misleading statements. 53
Because the California Supreme Court decided this case on a
grant of a demurrer by the California Superior Court, all of the al-
legations of the complaint had to be accepted as true on appeal.54
Thus, as the issue was framed in the United States Supreme Court,
because Nike's speech was made with actual malice, any decision
about whether the Constitution prohibits liability for false com-
mercial statements based on anything less than actual malice
would have been dicta.
Finally, apart from the Nike litigation, when the Supreme
Court ultimately confronts the issue of scienter required for false
commercial speech, it should hold that in this area liability can be
based on intentional, reckless, or negligent false statements of fact
intended to sell products to consumers. The government has a cru-
cial interest in ensuring that commercial speech is accurate so that
50 Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575).
5' CAL. Bus. & PROF CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 2000).
52 First Amended Complaint at 30, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (No. 994446).
51 Id. at 80.
54 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1158-59 (1997) (allegations of
complaint are accepted as true in considering a demurrer).
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consumers can rely upon it. As the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he
First Amendment ... does not prohibit the State from insuring that
the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as
freely. 55
The actual malice standard urged by Nike56 would impose a
very strict standard on government or private plaintiffs bringing
actions for false commercial speech. In light of the crucial interest
in preventing false commercial speech, a company should be re-
quired to exercise due care and thus should be potentially liable if
its false statements were uttered intentionally, knowingly, reck-
lessly, or negligently.
B. False Commercial Speech Is Unprotected by the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has long held that "the State may ban
commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without fur-
ther justification., 57 Thus, it is firmly established that "[t]he States
and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading. '58
For commercial speech to come within First Amendment protec-
tion "it... must ... not be misleading., 5
9
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the need for
some protection for false political expression, 6° it has expressly
rejected such protection for false commercial speech. The Court
explained in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: "[T]he leeway for un-
truthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other
contexts has little force in the commercial arena." 61 Commercial
speech is protected so as to provide consumers with important in-
formation. False commercial speech is unprotected because it does
not serve this interest. As the Supreme Court explained, "the
elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to promote the
one facet of commercial price and product advertising that war-
rants First Amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of
accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private
decisionmaking. '' 62 In short, false political speech is protected be-
cause it contributes to the flow of ideas and because the market-
55 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
"6 Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575).
57 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,768 (1993) (citation omitted).
58 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (citation omit-
ted).
59 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
60 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (holding constitutional protection
of speech does not turn on the truth of the matter discussed).
61 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
62 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976).
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place of ideas will lead to the truth. False commercial speech does
neither.
Nike's position, if ultimately accepted by the Supreme Court,
will put in jeopardy a vast array of federal, state, and local laws
designed to protect consumers. For example, under the position
taken by Nike and its amici, a company could not be sued for false
advertising if it falsely posted "Going Out of Business Sale" signs
to attract customers. Nike would view the sign as non-commercial
speech because it is not about a specific product and is not about
its essential characteristics. Yet, such false advertising clearly
would run afoul of section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition in or affect-
ing commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce." 63 Nike's position would make many, if not
most, applications of this statute unconstitutional.
Indeed, Nike's position would make countless state and fed-
eral consumer protection laws unconstitutional. For example,
California law prohibits false or misleading statements about
whether products were made by blind workers, 64 American Indi-
ans,65 or union labor.66 Under the position taken by Nike, all of
these laws would be unconstitutional because such claims, in
Nike's view, do not constitute commercial speech. Likewise, state
laws designed to provide accurate information to consumers about
environmental claims in advertisements are, in Nike's view, also
unconstitutional. California, for example, enacted a statute provid-
ing: "It is unlawful for any person to make any untruthful, decep-
tive, or misleading environmental marketing claim, whether ex-
plicit or implied." But Nike and its amici would deny the gov-
ernment the power to ensure accurate statements by companies
concerning the consequences of their actions for the environment.
Federal law makes it unlawful to disseminate false advertising
by mail or other means that directly or indirectly induces consum-
ers to purchase food, drugs, services, or cosmetics.68 Nike's posi-
tion would make it unconstitutional to apply this law to false
statements by companies concerning whether their food was or-
ganic or whether their drugs and cosmetics were tested in a "cru-
elty free" manner. Laws ensuring accurate food labels would be-
come similarly vulnerable.
63 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
6' CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17522 (West 2000).
65 Id. at § 17569.
66 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1012 (West 2000).
67 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17850.5(a) (West 2000).
6' 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
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The list of laws endangered by Nike's position is endless.
Countless consumer protection laws seek to provide prospective
customers with accurate information about products. But Nike's
approach would place many claims beyond the reach of govern-
ment regulation and, in fact, would immunize the speakers from
liability.
CONCLUSION
Line drawing is always difficult. But the difficulty of draw-
ing a line is not a reason to abandon the effort entirely. In the con-
text of current First Amendment law, line drawing often is deter-
minative of whether speech can be punished. For example, false
commercial speech can be prohibited and punished by the govern-
ment, but false political speech generally cannot be outlawed or
punished. Therefore, the definition of what constitutes commer-
cial speech is crucial in determining whether there can be civil or
criminal liability for speech. Nike v. Kasky was a potentially im-
portant case because it focused on exactly the question of whether
Nike's advertisements and speech should have been regarded as
commercial or political speech.
The Supreme Court's dismissal of Nike v. Kasky and its sub-
sequent settlement end that litigation, but offer no resolution of the
underlying issue. Lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
will need to grapple with exactly the question posed and not re-
solved by the Supreme Court.
Lines are always best drawn with reference to the underlying
purposes to be served. The goal of treating commercial speech as
a distinct category is to allow the government to regulate and pro-
hibit advertising to protect consumers. From this perspective, the
California Supreme Court got it exactly right: A company's false
statements about its product should be regarded as commercial
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.
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